DePaul University
From the SelectedWorks of Donald Hermann

Winter 1981

Airports and the Applicability of the Antitrust
Laws
Donald H Hermann, DePaul University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/donald-hermann/58/

+(,121/,1(
Citation:
Donald H. J. Hermann, Airports and the Applicability of
the Antitrust Laws, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 353 (1981)
Provided by:
Rinn Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Wed Mar 21 12:27:06 2018
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
your smartphone or tablet device

AIRPORTS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
Donald H.J. Hermann*
Until the United States Supreme Court decision in City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co.,' government-owned-and-operated airports
were treated as exempt from the antitrust laws." This exemption was derived from an interpretation of the earlier Supreme Court decision in Parker
v. Brown,3 which was read as providing a blanket exemption for states and
their agencies, including municipalities and special agencies authorized to
carry out responsibilities in specified areas such as regional airport authorities.4 Since the decision in City of Lafayette, great concern has arisen with
regard to the extent to which the antitrust laws are applicable to airport
authorities, both in their central and subsidiary activities.5 This Article will
briefly outline the legal character of airports and the nature of their central
and subsidiary functions. Consideration will then be given to judicial decisions prior to the City of Lafayette which have had to determine the applicability of the antitrust laws to airports. Then a review of the opinion in
City of Lafayette will be undertaken in order to determine its full effect on
the applicability of the antitrust law to airports and the problems that may
arise as a result. Finally, an effort will be made to suggest the proper extent
to which airport authorities should be liable under the antitrust laws as to
both central and subsidiary activities and to the form of authorization provided airport authorities to engage in the various activities they have undertaken. Recent district court cases applying City of Lafayette to airports will
be analyzed in light of these suggestions. It should be noted at the outset
that the City of Lafayette case itself dealt with alleged anticompetitive activity of two municipally-owned electric utility companies which were sued
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. A.B. Stanford University, 1965; M.A. Northwestern
University, 1979; J.D. Columbia University, 1968; LL.M. Harvard University, 1974; Ph.D. (Candidate), Northwestern University, 1980.
435 U.S. 389 (1978).
* See, e.g., E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
See, e.g., Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
See, Bangasser, Exposure of MunicipalCorp. to Liability for Violations of the Antitrust Laws:
Antitrust Immunity after the City of Lafayette Decision, 11 URBAN LAW. at vii, xxiv-xxvi
(1979); Handler, Antitrust - 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1382 (1978); Comment, The Erosion of State Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 165, 182 (1978).
i See, e.g., Greenbaum & Bosco, Study of Developments in Airport Law 1978, 11 URBAN
LAW.

363 (1979).
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by an investor-owned utility for injuries arising out of these practices. The

Supreme Court, in reaching its decision held that municipalities were not
wholly immune from the anticompetitive prohibitions of the Sherman Act.'
0 435 U.S. 389 at 413-16. The standards imposed and restrictions meted out under the Sherman Act have been described as falling into two categories; those to which the per se standard
is applied and those to which the rule of reason standard is applied. While it is unclear, at this
point, which standard will be applied against alleged antitrust violations of airports, the following brief discussion of these two standards is offered so that the cases discussed in the Article
may be measured against the traditional classifications of the antitrust cause of action.
Generally only those practices which blatantly offend the Sherman Act's policy of furthering
competition are found to be per se violations. "Where such offensive practices are found they
are considered per se unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See Hutter, "Dirty Tricks" and Section One of the Sherman Act: Federalizing State Unfair Competition Law, 18 BOSTON COL. INDUS. & COM. L. REv.
239, 268-72 (1977). Professor Hutter properly observes the following ramifications concerning
the per se violation:
Included on this roll of condemned practices are pricefixing, group boycotts, market division and tying arrangements. Thus, if the plaintiff alleges facts that fall within a per se
category, the defendant must rebut the facts or the claim that they constitute a per se
violation, or else he will lose the case. The defendant will not be given an opportunity to
show or establish any underlying motive for his conduct or its actual competitive effects
for his conduct is presumed anticompetitive.
Id. at 268. See also Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. Rav. 1165, 1166
n.4 (1964).
When a practice other than price-fixing, group boycott, market division or a tying arrangement is involved, its validity is measured according to the second antitrust standard - the rule
of reason. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1967). Mr. Justice
Brandeis is credited with the classic interpretation of the rule of reason standard in Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), in which he stated:
The case was rested upon the bald proposition, that a rule or agreement by which men
occupying positions of strength in any branch of trade, fixed prices at which they would
buy or sell during an important part of the business day, is an illegal restraint of trade
under the Anti-Trust Law. But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be
determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.
Id. at 238.
It should be recognized that one standard is the opposite of the other. This is not to imply,
however, that once the veil of sovereign immunity to the antitrust laws is removed, that a
municipal actor will be treated by one standard, instead of the other. It would logically follow
that once the veil of immunity was abolished, any government actor that engaged in one of the
activities traditionally receiving per se treatment would in fact receive such handling by the
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Because airport facilities are often owned and operated by municipal authorities, the question of the applicability of the antitrust laws to the operation of these facilities is clearly raised by the opinion in City of Lafayette.

I.

THE NATURE OF AIRPORT ACTIVITY

By 1968, it was reported that the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) recorded 9,566 airports in this country, of which 2,747 had paved runways.7
The legal character of these airports, although rarely the same from airport
to airport, has the following broad outline. Under the Federal Aviation Act,
the FAA exercises direct control over the construction and operation of the
airways system in this country, which includes air traffic control and navigational and other flight services including a vast communications network. s
While the airway system is under federal ownership and control, only two
public airports are under federal control-Washington National and Dulles
International. All other airports are owned and operated by private, state,
local or joint public authorities, or are owned by a public authority and operated by a private fixed-base operator.9 Terminal airway facilities physically located at an airport are usually under federal ownership and control;
there is often dual responsibility for operation of terminal areas. However,
airport runways, taxiways, hangars, terminal buildings, access roads, automobile parking and services attendant to service and maintenance of aircraft and passenger services are generally the responsibility of private, state
or local authorities."0
The more central an activity is to the establishment and operation of an
airport, the more likely it is to be found within the legislative mandate or
authorization of the airport authority. While it is difficult to ascertain the
exact scope of the definition of these 'central activities,' such definition
clearly must include maintenance of runways, terminals and other aspects of
fixed-base operations, in order to adequately provide for the safe landing
and take-off of aircraft, along with accommodation for boarding and discharging passengers. 1 In other words the definition of 'central activity' must
judicial system.
G. SCULLIN, INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 289 (1968).
s Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
* J. WARFORD, PUBLIC POLICY TowARD GENERAL AVIATION 25 (1971). Fixed-base operation is
defined "as one that provides facilities, fuel, equipment, supplies and services at an airport
which are used by aircraft crews, passengers, and in handling freight connected tjherewith. It is
vital to air transportation." E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d
52, 53 n.2 (Ist Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
'8 J. WARFORD, supra note 9, at 25.
11 See, e.g., Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
In this case, the court noted: "There is no question in our minds but that the regulation of
ground transportation services is necessarily incident to the management and operation of the
airport facilities." Id. at 1260.
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encompass the power to engage in those pursuits necessary to enable the
airport authority to fulfill its legislative obligation to provide airport
services."
With the expansion of air travel, however, those administering airports
have been called upon to provide a broad range of attendant or subsidiary
services.' 8 The services available at any airport of significant size may include car rental services, bus and limousine services, hotel shuttles, taxis
and parking facilities along with restaurants, bars, food and beverage concessions, newsstands, insurance machines, gift shops, barber shops, insurance counters and even hotel and motel accommodations.
In light of this range of activities it is important to note that while it may
be impossible to develop a precise definition of 'central activity,' it is possible to place activities along a spectrum. This spectrum would range from
those functions essential to carry out the legislative mandate for safe ingress
and egress at airports, to those functions more tenuously related to legislative authorization for this purpose, such as hotels, motels and barber shops.
The Supreme Court in Cantor v.Detroit Edison Co." offered an analogy
that may be of assistance in determining whether an activity is subsidiary.
In this case the Court considered the activities of a state-licensed private
utility and distinguished its central activity of providing electric power from
a state-approved, but not required, practice of distributing light bulbs in a
manner that restrained trade. The latter activity was found to be subject to
antitrust prohibitions.

II. PRE-City of Lafayette TREATMENT OF AIRPORTS UNDER THE

ANTITRUST

LAWS

Prior to the decision in City of Lafayette, a number of private actions
were commenced against airport authorities by parties seeking to establish
concessions or agents at airports or to provide services in competition with
those provided either by private firms already authorized to transact business by airport authorities or by the airport authority itself."5 All of these
" The ability to contract with other parties in order to fulfill this mandate is assumed to be
a part of the overall authorization to airport authorities.
13 G. SCULLIN, supra note 7, at 23-25.
" 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See, e.g., Continental Bus Systs., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp.
359 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Trans World Assocs., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, [1974] 2 TRADE
CAS ES (CCH) 1 75,293 (D.D.C. 1974).
Is Several of these cases will be discussed below. These include: Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev.
Agency of the Mo.-Ill. Metropolitan Dist., 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970); E.W. Wiggins Airways,
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966);
Dollar Rent A Car Systs., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 434 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Chestnut Fleet
Rentals, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., [1977] 1 TRADE CASES (CCH) T 61,307 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Continental

Bus Systs., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Trans World Assocs., Inc.
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cases were determined to be governed by the doctrine of implied exemption
for "state action" expounded in the Parker v. Brown opinion."6 This case
involved an attack on the California Agriculture Prorate Act which authorized the state director of agriculture and other authorities to adopt marketing programs regulating the production, disposition and prices of raisins
produced in California. In upholding the statute, the United States Supreme
Court found that there was "nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or
in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. 1 7 The Court
concluded that in providing this regulatory scheme, the legislature of California, acting "as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government." It should be noted that the specific regulatory act attacked in
Brown was not stipulated in the Agriculture Prorate Act; rather the decision
to adopt a program of restrictions was to be made by a state commission
after petition by a specified number of producers.1 9 Any approved program,
according to the statute, would be administered by a committee composed
of interested producers and a specified number of public appointments.
While it was conceded that this program would deny the benefits of competition to consumers, the Court held the statutory authorization was exempt
v. City & County of Denver, [1974] 2 TRADE CAS s (CCH) 1 75,293 (D.D.C. 1974); In re Hertz
Corp., 88 F.T.C. 715 (1976).
16 317 U.S. 341 (1943). There has arisen some discussion of whether the state action immunity doctrine of Parker is an example of an exemption from the antitrust law or whether the
inapplicability of the federal antitrust laws to acts and practices required or authorized by state
laws results from the operation of principles of federal preemption derived from the supremacy
clause of the Constitution. See Handler, Antitrust - 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1374-88
(1978). Professor Handler properly notes that preemption and exemption are analytically distinct. The preemption doctrine operates to establish the primacy of federal law in the face of
conflicting state law while the exemption doctrine is based on the expressed or implied intent
of Congress to remove an activity or party from coverage of the act. While the Parkeropinion is
obscure as to whether its decision rests on preemption or exemption, the cases construing
Parkermake it clear that it has been interpreted to be an exemption case. The question asked
in each interpreting opinion has been whether the activity or party falls within the exempted
category. This interpretation is reflected in the opinion in City of Lafayette itself where the
Court concluded: "[T]he Parkerdoctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as
an act of government by the State as sovereign, or by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy
to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 435 U.S. at 413 (emphasis
added). If Handler were correct that the state action immunity is to be determined by the
extent of preemption, it would not seem to matter whether the state as sovereign or its agency,
the municipality, were authorized or engaged in the anticompetitive practices; rather, it would
be a matter of whether the area of activity were left to the state and its subdivisions. On the
other hand, if the state action immunity is one of an exemption, explicit or implied, then it
becomes a matter of the intent of Congress as to what circumstances or conditions must be
present for the exemption to be available. This latter approach is that which has been adopted
by the federal courts that have attempted to determine exactly under what conditions state
mandating of activity will be found to constitute state action.
317 U.S. at 350-5i.
Id. at 352.
I
Id.
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from application of the Sherman Act.
The decision of the Court in Parker v. Brown was based on a consideration of the statutory history and language of the Sherman Act. In reviewing
the legislative history, the Court found no suggestion of a Congressional
purpose "to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature;" moreover the Court read the legislative history as suggesting that the purpose of the Sherman Act was to suppress business combinations of private individuals.' 0 An examination of the language of the
statute led the Court to the conclusion that the Act applied to "persons"
and not states with the result that state-compelled acts did not fall within
the reach of the statute.21 A consideration outside the statute that militated
against subjecting the state program to Sherman Act requirements was a
concern with federalism, which led the Court to observe that "an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress."" Rather, the Sherman Act, according
to the Court, was to be applied in such a way as to provide the states the
maximum opportunity to meet local needs through programs of regulation
and local governmental activity."3
State-authorized airports were held to be within the state action immunity enunciated by Parker because they were established to meet the state
needs of transportation for its citizens. There has been a long-standing recognition of the public purpose of airports as well as the propriety of public
authorities' establishing airport facilities.' " Every state has legislation authorizing public bodies to acquire, maintain and operate public airports,"5
and there has been long-standing judicial recognition of the constitutionality
of municipal and county governments' undertaking the development of airports with the use of public funds. 0 A number of courts specifically found
20o Id.-at 350-51.
$ Id. at 351.
32 Id.
23 Id. at 362-63.
24 See generally Grover, The Legal Basis of Municipal Airports, 5 J. AIR L. & Com. 410
(1934); Note, The Public Nature of Airports, 30 GEo. L. J. 198 (1941).
" See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 15 1/ § 68.8 (Smith-Hurd 1963) providing authority for municipal airports and § 122 providing authority for county airports. See also N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 350 (McKinney 1974) for authority for establishment and location of airport or landing
field and CAL. PuB. UT.. CODE § 21631 (Deering 1970) for state establishment of airports by
other political subdivisions, and § 22004 for authority for creation of airport districts.
Justice Cardozo provided one of the early statements of judicial recognition of the public
purpose of providing airports in Hesse v. Rath, 249 N.Y. 436, 164 N.E. 342 (1928), when he
wrote:
We think the purpose to be served is both public and municipal.
A city acts for city purposes when it builds a dock or a bridge or a street or a subway. . . .Its purpose is not different when it builds an airport. . . .Aviation is today an
established method of transportation. The future, even the near future, will make it still
more general. The city that is without the foresight to build the ports for the new traffic
may soon be left behind in the race of competition. Chalcedon was called the city of the
blind, because its founders rejected the nobler site of Byzantium lying at their feet. The
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that airports constituted a "public authority," which municipal authorities
are authorized to establish under their charters.2
It is clear that airports have long been considered a legitimate governmental function with their activities carried out for a public purpose. Within
this broad governmental mandate, the nature of the governmental unit responsible for the airport and the character of the legislative authorization
vary greatly among airports in this country. Most states provide authority
for a range of governmental units to establish airport facilities. These units
include municipalities,2 8 counties,"9 and airports owned jointly by neighboring governmental units.8s These statutes also provide authority for the creation of special airport districts.2 "
The form of governmental authority has had an important relationship to
the financial arrangements of the individual airport, and may have significance for potential antitrust liability. The range of arrangements underlying
domestic airports can be seen in the comparison between the Kansas City
International Airport and the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority.
The Kansas City International Airport has been established by the city of
Kansas City, but the airport is self-financing; it has no access to tax revenue
nor the credit of the city in its borrowing. 2 Airlines enter into agreements to
lease upon terms that will provide adequate coverage for the airport's debt
service. The airlines in turn control the airport authority's expenditure. The
air field and tenant space of the terminals run on a self-liquidating financial
basis. However, airport concession revenues are not used to reduce airline
rentals or use fees below the cost of supplying the facilities. Moreover, some
terminal building and terminal space is considered occupied by the public as
a tenant, and a rent charge is obtained from the profits derived from airport
concessions.
In contrast, the Nashville Airport Authority has been established as a separate metropolitan airport authority under special state legislation enacted
in 1969.8 The Authority carries out its activity as a completely self-financing state corporation. Its financing has been accomplished by sale of bonds
need for vision of the future in the governance of cities has not lessened with the years.
The dweller within the gates, even more the stranger from afar, will pay the price of
blindness.
Id. at 438, 164 N.E. at 342.
See also Krenwinkle v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 2d 611, 51 P.2d 1098 (1935); City of
Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100, 263 P. 12 (1928); Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11
S.W.2d 1045 (1928).
07 See, e.g., State ex. rel. City of Lincoln v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N.W. 273 (1928);
State ex. rel. Chendler v. Jackson, 121 Ohio St. 186, 167 N.E. 396 (1929).
28 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 §§ 11-101-1, 11-102-1, 11-103-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
28 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 15 '/2 § 122 (Smith-Hurd 1963).
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 15 1/2 § 252 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81).
31 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 15 '/2 § 68.2f (Smith-Hurd 1963).
"2See Smith, Considerationsin Local Administrationof Airports in Canada,in 3 ANNALS OF
Aia & SPACE LAW 253-54 (1978).
" Id. at 254-56.
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with joint and several liability of the tenant carriers. Concession revenue is
cumulated and used to reduce the liability of airline tenants. The Authority
is bound to be managed on sound business principles and specifically covenants that it will operate the airport in a manner to produce revenues from
concessionaires, tenants and other users in accordance with a standard of
sound airport management."
Differences among airport authorities, both in terms of legal authorization
and in terms of type of operation, become extremely important after the
City of Lafayette decision. However, even prior to Lafayette, these differences were significant in the maintenance of antitrust actions among
nonairport parties to litigation involving airport concessions, for these differences were often used as the basis for determining whether state-directed
activities were involved and hence whether the Parker v. Brown exemption
applied.8 Chesnut Fleet Rentals, Inc. v. Hertz Corp. involved charges of
antitrust violations in the airport automobile rental business.8 6 The plaintiffs, operating off-airport, short-term car rental firms alleged that the three
largest national car rental firms had conspired to fix prices, to restrain trade
in and to monopolize the car rental market, and that they acquired and
maintained monopoly power by illegally restraining competitors from gain87
ing rental commissions in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 2388 of a class of all persons,
firms, corporations and other entities other than the defendants, who were
engaged in short-term leasing of automobiles. In considering the propriety
of a class action, the district court was led to consider the nature of the
airport car rental business, which constitutes the largest part of the car
rental industry's activity.8' The court concluded that a class action was improper because of the different legal issues presented as a result of the differing legal authority and form of statutory authorization under which each
airport operated. The court reasoned that to establish liability under the
antitrust laws, the plaintiffs would need to proceed with proof on an airport" A question which became significant after City of Lafayette is, what will happen to an
activity that is clearly proprietary but that was permitted by the legislature or is a function of a
public airport? See Burger's concurrence in City of Lafayette.

" See, e.g., Dollar Rent A Car Systs., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 434 F. Supp. 513, 517 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
84 [19771 1 TRADE CAszs (CCH) 61,307 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See also Dollar Rent A Car Systs.,
Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 434 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1977) consolidated into In re Airport Car
Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1976).

Federal Rule 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the repre-

sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
1,[1977] 1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 161,307 at 71,013 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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by-airport basis, since each airport would provide a unique competitive environment." The court concluded that, given the variety in form and authorization of various airports, "the competitive climate at each one of the
many airports nationwide must be demonstrated, since each is governed by
particular rules, regulations, ordinances and policies unique to it. Then the
relevant class members must be established on an individual-by-individual
basis as to each airport ... ."" This conclusion implies that the Parker defense relating to governmental exemption 4' and defenses relating to efforts
to influence political institutions by competitors4 could be evaluated only
on an airport-by-airport basis. Thus not only the practices of the individual
defendants and the individual capacities of the plaintiffs needed to be determined, but also the individual airport context was of great significance.
It should be noted that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) did proceed
against the three major national car rental firms-Hertz, Avis and National-alleging a national program of collusion without regard to their activities at individual airports. 44 By establishing a nationwide conspiracy
among the major car rental concerns, the FTC was able to litigate on the
basis of a national market of car rental activity and avoid the problem of
Chesnut Fleet Rentals, Inc. where the private plaintiff was compelled to
litigate on the basis of the markets in which it was present or potentially
present, and was thus faced with the need to establish that the anticompetitive practices in each market were subject to the antitrust laws and not subject to state action immunity. The FTC maintained that from 1968, the
three major firms, individually and collectively, maintained and protected a
highly concentrated, noncompetitive market structure throughout the
United States by employing nationally coordinated programs affecting various local on-airport auto rental markets. The specific practices alleged to be
in violation of the antitrust laws included: conspiring among themselves to
submit common bids and contract provisions for airport car rental concessions, conspiring to raise barriers to entry and to exclude competitors from
the airport car rental markets, conspiring to fix and stabilize prices and conspiring to harass smaller competitors. This action resulted in a consent decree whereby the three defendant firms agreed to cease and desist from conId. at 71,015. The court observed:
Each airport presents a different factual and legal problem because each is subject to
different state or local operating rules, ordinances, and regulations. The competitive situation at airport A in state A is likely to be quite different from airport B in State B.
Even within the same state, the airports may be regulated and operated in a different
fashion by different municipalities.

40

Id. at 71,015.
4 Id. at 71,016.
4'The court cited Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1941).
48 The court cited Eastern R.R. President's Conference v.

Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961). The implications of third party actions in dealing with legislatively-mandated
airport authorities will be discussed at length in the text at notes 103-57 infra.
4 In re Hertz Corp., 88 F.T.C. 715 (1976).
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spiring to monopolize, to fix prices and to obtain bid specifications which
precluded smaller firms from airport markets by requiring bids to include
firm credit card facilities, a national reservation system, operation in a minimum number of airports, the provision of one-way rental service and a requirement for number of years experience in the industry. All of these practices were viewed as providing barriers to entry. Moreover, the firms agreed
not to conspire to prevent the smaller firms from having access to airport
public address systems, from having public pick-up and discharge areas,
from having advertising facilities at various airports and from having direct
telephone lines in airport terminals. Finally, the defendants were compelled
to forego renewal options at most airports where they operated, but were
allowed to renegotiate their concessions when their then-current contracts
expired. There was, however, no consideration in the complaint or decree of
the status of the individual airports nor of the liability of any airport authority as a party to the conspiracy; rather the action was limited to consideration of a national conspiracy existing among the three defendant firms.
A number of post-Parker v. Brown cases did involve consideration of the
status of particular airports and allegations of conspiracy between airport
authorities and individual concession holders. 0 E.W. Wiggipzs Airways, Inc.
v. Massachusetts Port Authority4" involved a suit by a fixed-base air transportation firm which was capable of operating at Boston's Logan Airport,
against the Massachusetts Port Authority and a competing fixed-base operator, the Butler Company. The complaint alleged a conspiracy to establish a
sole and exclusive fixed-base operation at Logan Airport in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The defendants contended that the Port
Authority in its operation of Logan Airport acted as an agent of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the performance of a governmental function,
and that any restraint or monopoly resulting from its governmental action
47
did not violate the Sherman Act.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals felt compelled to consider the nature
of the Port Authority. 48 The court concluded that the Massachusetts Legislature had constituted the Port Authority as a public instrumentality with
the wide powers normally bestowed upon instrumentalities of government,"
and that the exercise of the powers conferred upon it were held in the performance of an essential governmental function. In designating Butler as
the single fixed-base operator,50 the court held that the Port Authority "was
45 See, e.g., Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of the Mo.-Ill. Metropolitan
Dist., 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970).
41

362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966). E.W. Wiggins provided facilities, fuel, equipment, supplies and

services at Boston's Logan Airport which could be used by aircraft, crews and passengers in
handling air freight.

" Id. at 55. The conduct of third parties and government entities authorized to perform
airport functions will be discussed in detail at notes 103-57 infra.
4' Id.
'9 MAss. ANN. LAws. Spec. L. C. 73 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1967).
'o See note 9 supra for a discussion df fixed-base operations.
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acting as an instrumentality or agency of the state, pursuant to the legislative mandate imposed upon it to operate and manage the airport and establish rules and regulations for its use." 1 The court rejected plaintiff's
contention that as a result of the Port Authority's operation of Logan Airport, it was engaged in a purely proprietary capacity and that it was merely
conducting a private business. The court went on to cite Parkerv. Brown as
authority for the exemption of state-directed activities from the Sherman
Act. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that the Port Authority was
subject to the antitrust laws because it could sue or be sued in its own name
like a person. The court thus did not place much weight on the statement in
Parker v. Brown that the antitrust law was applicable only to persons. Specifically, the court refused to find antitrust liability merely because the defendant governmental agency was treated as a party capable of undertaking
or being subjected to legal proceedings. Finally, the court held that simply
because a lease or contract agreement between the governmental agency and
the private party was an exclusive arrangement, it was not, because of its
exclusive nature, to be considered a conspiracy or illegal. Since the action of
the Port Authority in granting the exclusive lease was not illegal, the conduct of Butler i becoming a party to the exclusive arrangement could not
be considered illegal. The court concluded that Wiggins had failed to state a
cause of action.52
Wiggins involved a special statutory authority created by the state of
Massachusetts to operate an airport." The courts, however, prior to City of
Lafayette did not limit immunity from the antitrust laws just to airports
operating under the Wiggins type of authorization. For instance, in Ladue
Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois
Metropolitan District," the Eighth Circuit held that the antitrust law did
not apply to an airport operated under the auspices of an intergovernmental
authority. This intergovernmental agency was organized under the laws of
Illinois and Missouri whose statutes jointly provided that the agency possessed broad powers to operate airports." The plaintiff, Ladue, a private bus
company, alleged that this joint state agency monopolized bus transportation in eastern Missouri and western Illinois. The court found, however, that
the defendant, Bi-State, was legislatively authorized by the states of Illinois
and Missouri to operate in the field of public transportation and therefore
was not subject to the antitrust laws.
The court cited Parker v. Brown as authority for the proposition that the
51362

F.2d at 55 (emphasis added).
Id. at 56.
See note 49 supra.
433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 70373 (Vernon 1959). These powers enabled the agency to acquire by
gift, purchase or lease and to plan, construct, operate and maintain, or to lease to others for
operation and maintenance, bridges, tunnels, airports, passenger transportation facilities and
air, water, rail, motor vehicle and other terminal facilities.
"
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Sherman Act was not intended to restrain state action and was intended to
prevent only business combinations. The court also cited Wiggins as settled
authority for the proposition that "the antitrust laws do not apply to state
56
government or activities undertaken pursuant to legislative mandate."1
The Ladue court went on to consider the argument that an examination
of the exemption of state governmental activity required that a distinction
be made between truly governmental activity and proprietary activity. The
plaintiff had sought to categorize as proprietary the conduct of operating a
bus service. The court, however, observed that the issue should not be
viewed as one of immunity of state action but rather the exemption of state
activity from the antitrust laws, stating that: "[elven if we assume the sovereign immunity of Bi-State to be waived by the terms of the compact or by
engaging in a proprietary action, Congress has not exercised its authority to
impose liability since the antitrust laws are not directed at governmental
action." 7 The court also discussed the propriety of states engaging in the
activity of providing transportation services following an official assessment
of the lack of an acceptable level of services in the area. The fact that the
provision of these services involved the agency in the obtaining and exercising of monopoly powers did not, by that fact, bring it in violation of the
antitrust laws:
When a state determines that it is in the public interest to operate a public
transportation system as a monopoly, or when two states enter into a congressionally approved compact to do so, the antitrust laws do not apply, whether
the operation is labeled proprietary or governmental. The fact that the effect
of the compact gives Bi-State a monopoly and that competitive interests of
private concerns are harmed does not violate the Sherman Act. We deem it
well settled that when a state announces a public policy against free competition in an industry essential to it, state control and regulation of that industry,
even to the extent of eliminating competition, is permissible."
The court concluded that the defendant was a governmental body created

by state statutes, operating under legislative authorization, and as such was
not subject to the antitrust laws.
Ladue presented a situation where a transportation authority, itself providing a service, obtained and exercised monopoly power. There is nothing
in principle which suggests that the outcome should be different where a
transportation or airport authority contracts with a private party to provide
a service under a legislative grant of authority even where such a contract is
exclusive. Such an arrangement is in fact a more conventional type of airport authority. In Padgett v. Louisville and Jefferson County Air Board,50
the Sixth Circuit considered this more conventional type of airport authority in a case brought by independent taxicab drivers alleging a violation of
433 F.2d at 135.

Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 137.
s Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
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the antitrust laws by the Air Board in granting an exclusive contract for
taxicab service to a major taxicab company, Yellow Cab Company. This case
applied Parker v. Brown after a consideration of the legislative authorization establishing the airport authority. The court concluded that Kentucky
statutes established the Air Board as a quasigovernmental agency. Two provisions were regarded as particularly significant: the first gave counties, cities and joint governmental units the authority to establish airport authorities 0 and the second granted airport authorities governmental and
corporate powers. 61 The provision included the statement that "the exercise
of any other powers granted to air boards or municipalities in this chapter,
are hereby declared to be public, governmental and municipal functions,
exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public necessity."62 This
phrase would seem particularly significant in evaluating whether the activities of an airport authority are legislatively authorized.
In Wiggins s the First Circuit, in considering fixed-base operations, had
dealt with an activity central to the operation of Logan Airport. In Padgett," the Sixth Circuit considered a more subsidiary activity, the provision
of taxicab service to passengers. In the latter case, the court nevertheless
found the activity to be within the scope of powers the legislature had authorized the Air Board to exercise. The court found that air travelers require ground transportation and it followed that the Air Board, as the agent
of the state in performing its function, had a duty to provide adequate and
reliable services. The court reasoned: "In the instant case, the state has legislatively created an instrumentality, the Air Board, whose charge is, inter
alia, to operate the airport. There is no question in our own minds but that
the regulation of ground transportation services is necessarily incident to
the management and operation of the airport facilities." 65 The court went on
to rule that the grant of exclusive contracts or, in the alternative, a requiring
" 492 F.2d at 1259 citing Ky. REV. STAT. § 183.012(2) providing in part: "As used in this
chapter, 'governmental unit' means any city or the combination of any two (2) or more thereof,
or any county, or combination of two (2) or more such counties, city or cities, acting jointly with
any county or counties or an airboard or board established as provided in this chapter."
61 Id. at 1259-60 citing Ky. REv. STAT. § 183.132 providing:
(1) Any city or county, or city and county acting jointly, or any combination of two or
more cities and/or counties may establish a non partisan air board composed of six members. (2) The board shall be a body politic and corporate with the usual corporate attributes, and its corporate name may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with and
do all things reasonable or necessary to effectively carry out the duties prescribed by
statute. The board shall constitute a legislative body for the purpose of [Ky. REV. STAT.]
183.630 to 183.740.
This grant specifically included the power to engage in the acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipping and operation of airports.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 183.476 cited in 492 F.2d at 1260 (emphasis added).
K
E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 947, cited as authority in Padgett, 429 F.2d at 1260.
" Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Rd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
66 Id. at 1260.
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of permission of noncontracting taxi operators to provide service was within
the power of the airport authority. The court concluded that: "the Board in
contracting for cab service at the airport was exercising a valid governmental function to which the antitrust laws do not apply."66
Padgett involved the airport authority as a party to an exclusive contract
for taxicab service; it can be argued that there is no principled basis for
distinguishing between taxicab service and other subsidiary services provided to airlines or passengers using an airport facility. Thus, it is not surprising that in Trans World Associates, Inc. v. City and County of Denver,6" the United States District Court in Colorado held that the City and
County of Denver, in the operation of its airport, was privileged to negotiate
exclusive agreements with airport rental automobile concessions that would
otherwise violate the Sherman Act. The City of Denver had adopted a policy
of limiting the number of rental car concessions at Stapleton Airport to five
and of selecting the concessionaires by a process of negotiation. The plaintiff
rental car firm had obtained permission to deliver and pick up its cars at the
airport, however it demanded the grant of an airport site or, in the alternative, that the grant of concessions be made by competitive bid. Among its
claims in its federal court action, the plaintiff alleged violation of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act; the plaintiff urged that the rule that antitrust
laws do not apply to valid governmental action was limited to activities of
cities in their governmental capacity and did not apply to city activity which
was of a proprietary nature. The court found that the legislature of Colorado
had specifically authorized the establishment of airports by cities and
granted them broad powers; furthermore, this legislation declared these
powers "to be public governmental functions exercised for the public purpose . . . to be acquired and used for public . . . necessity."

8

The court

declared the distinction between proprietary and governmental activity to
be irrelevant in determining that legislatively-mandated governmental activity was exempt from the federal antitrust law. The court went on to hold
that since the City of Denver was privileged to enter into exclusive agreements for providing car-rental services at its airport, the parties with whom
the city contracted were entitled to antitrust immunity.
This review of airport litigation prior to the decision in City of Lafayette
reveals that the Parker v. Brown decision was applied in a consistent manner to support the conclusion that public airports established pursuant to
state legislative authority were exempt from antitrust liability. This exemption was applied to activity whether it was characterized as governmental or
"Id.
[19741 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 75,293, at 97,897-900 (D. Colo. 1974). See also Continental
Bus Systs., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (holding that the grant of
an exclusive franchise to a joint municipally-owned bus line did not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act).
" [1974] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 75,293 at 97,900 citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-4-1 (1963)
(current version at COLO.'REv. STAT. § 41-4-101 (1974)).
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proprietary as long as it was directly or indirectly authorized by the legislation providing for the establishment and operation of public airports. The
exemption applied to activity central to the creation and operation of the
airports as well as to subsidiary activities serving airport passengers including bus service and car rental service. Moreover, the exemption was interpreted to cover contractual agreements with private parties to provide the
central and subsidiary services found to be authorized by statute. Concomitant to the finding of an exemption to antitrust liability for public authorities, the courts recognized the existence of antitrust immunity for private
parties who contracted with the exempted public airport authorities.

III. THE DECISION IN City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light
Co.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co."" two cities, each
of whom owned and operated their own utilities, brought suit against a privately-owned utility alleging violations of the Sherman Act. The complaint
alleged conspiracy to restrain trade, attempt to monopolize and monopolization of generation, of transmission and of distribution of electric power by
acting to prevent construction and operation of competing utility systems,
by improperly refusing to wheel power and by engaging in boycotts and
sham litigation.70 The private utility counterclaimed and sought injunctive
relief and damages alleging that the two cities had also committed various
violations of the antitrust law. The counterclaim alleged that the cities had
conspired to prevent the private utility from constructing a nuclear generating plant and had conspired to eliminate competition within their municipal
boundaries by restrictive convenants and long-term supply contracts and by
requiring customers to buy electric power from the cities as a condition for
obtaining water and gas.71 The district court dismissed the counterclaim on
the grounds that the plaintiffs, as cities, were immune from prosecution
under the antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for further inquiry to determine whether Congress intended to exempt cities from the antitrust laws in all cases.72 The United
7
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeals.
GO435 U.S. 389 (1978). The remainder of this Article will consider the impact of the decision
in City of Lafayette on the previously established exemption of airports from antitrust liability
and the immunity of private parties who contract with public airport authorities. A full analysis

of the opinion in City of Lafayette is beyond the scope of this Article, therefore, the discussion
of the decision will be limited to a brief review of the case and to a statement of its holding,
which will be used to evaluate possible limitations on the previously recognized exemption of
public authorities from antitrust liability.
10 Id.
at 392 n.5.

71Id. at 392 n.6.
72 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976).
73 435 U.S. 389.
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The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner cities
failed to establish an absolute immunity of municipalities from the antitrust
law. The petitioners argued that they, as municipalities, were immune from
the antitrust law. They also argued that since they exist to serve the public
welfare and not to make a profit,2 ' it was not necessary to subject municipalities to the antitrust law to protect the public since political remedies are
available to aggrieved parties.7 The court reasoned that it was not anomalous to subject municipalities to the antitrust law since other federal laws
that impart sanctions upon persons have been imposed on municipalities. I
As to the second proposition, the Court concluded that the antitrust laws
were needed to protect the public from anticompetitive practices on the part
of municipalities since such entities might operate to the prejudice of their
residents, local interests might be preferred over national interest in competition and parties not residents of the municipality might be effectively pre7
cluded from political redress. 7
The principal contention of the petitioner cities was that the Parkerstate
action exemption also applied to state subdivisions, namely to municipalities.7 8 They argued that the Parker exemption applied to all governmental
entities by virtue of the fact that municipalities possess the same sovereign
power as the state.7 ' The Court rejected this argument and concluded that
the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct which was carried out pursuant to actually declared state policy.80
Thus, the plurality opinion in City of Lafayette interpreted Parker v.
Brown as not automatically exempting from the antitrust laws all governmental entities simply by reason of their status. After City of Lafayette only
that anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the
state as sovereign, or by its subdivisions pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service, will be exempt from
the antitrust laws. The important holding of the case is that subordinate
governmental bodies such as municipalities, and by inference airport authorities, are not exempt from the operation of the antitrust law by the mere
fact of their status, it now being necessary to determine whether the particular activity of the governmental unit is clearly within a legislative mandate
or authorization. The Court held, however, that it is not necessary that there
be an express statutory mandate for each act of the agency or governmental
body. Instead the Court held that an adequate state mandate exists for the
anticompetitive activities of municipalities and subordinate governmental
7,

Id. at 403.

71 Id. at 405-06.
"I Id. at 400-01. The Court cited as support for this proposition the following cases: California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944); Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450
(1941); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934).
7 435 U.S. at 403-04.
78 Id. at 408.
79 Id. at 408-15.
80 Id. at 415.
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units when it is found that the legislature contemplated the kind of action
complained of and then delegated authority to the entity to operate in a
particular manner.8
The Court did not preclude municipalities or other governmental agencies
from providing services on a basis that would otherwise be held to be a violation of the antitrust law; for the Court concluded, citing Parker with approval: "Parkerand its progeny make clear that a State properly may...
direct or authorize its instrumentalities to act in a way which, if it did not
reflect state policy would be inconsistent with the antitrust laws. '82 Nevertheless, there is an important caveat inserted at the conclusion of the opinion to the effect that even though state legislation may mandate or authorize
the exercise of monopoly power in engaging in a particular activity, the state
agency may not exercise that monopoly power in a way not specifically authorized by the empowering legislation. The Court observed: "True, even a
lawful monopolist may be subject to antitrust restraints when it seeks to
extend or exploit its monopoly in a manner not contemplated by its
authorization." 83
The broad holding of the plurality opinion can be stated in the following
terms: a governmental unit may claim immunity from the antitrust law by
showing an adequate state legislative mandate or authorization for anticompetitive activities, and this mandate or authorization is established by showing that it was in the contemplation of the legislature that the governmental
unit would operate in the particular area and engage in the type of action
that is the subject of complaint.8" The concurring opinion of Justice Marshall suggests the narrowest reading to which the holding is susceptible: that
the antitrust exemption should be no broader than is necessary to serve the
state's legitimate purposes and that the state policy to displace competition
must be explicit and not merely implicit in the authorization that provides
the basis for engaging in a particular area of activity or for providing a particular service. Mr. Justice Marshall concluded: "[It is not enough that the
State 'desire[s] to insulate anticompetitive practices.' For there to be an antitrust exemption, the State must 'impose' the practices 'as an act of government.' State action involving more anticompetitive restraint than necessary
to effectuate governmental purposes must be viewed as inconsistent with the
plurality's approach." 85
Chief Justice Burger, concurring only in Part I of the plurality opinion
that provides that municipalities can be held subject to antitrust liability,
argues that municipalities should be exempt only in their "governmental"
and not their "proprietary" activity. The Chief Justice argued: "It should be
evident, I would think, that the running of a business enterprise is not an
8IId. at 415-16.

0' Id. at 417.
83 Id.

, Id. at 414-17.
Id. at 417-18.
I'
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integral operation in the area of traditional governmental functions."86 For
the antitrust exemption to apply, the Chief Justice would require an affirmative determination that anticompetitive activity is state action governmen-7
tal activity of the type which the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe.8
It is, nevertheless, clear that the plurality does not provide a requirement
for state action exemption that involves a differentiation between governmental and proprietary activity; rather the requirement for any exemption
is that the state legislation authorizing the activity in question authorize
explicitly or implicitly the conduct that would otherwise be subject to antitrust proscription.

IV.

APPLICATION OF

City of Lafayette

TO AIRPORTS AND AIRPORT

ACTIVITIES

A.

Providing Exclusive Services and Facilities

With the decision in City of Lafayette, the question is raised as to its
effect on the antitrust liability of airports as they are established by governmental units to provide exclusive services and facilities, and more particularly as they contract with private parties to provide the various services
associated with the establishment and maintenance of an airport facility.
Three federal district court opinions have directly addressed the question,
and each of these opinions will be discussed below. 86 Before taking up these
cases in detail, it is necessary to make some general observations about the
legal status of airports and their operation that are relevant in applying the
City of Lafayette opinions to these entities. These observations will include
a general analytic framework which it would seem desirable for courts to
keep in mind as they face litigation in this area.
It should be remembered that most airports have been organized and operate under statutory schemes developed while the Parker v. Brown opinion
was thought to provide very broad immunity for governmental entities and
that it is somewhat unfair to now scrutinize these statutes very closely for
explicit statements of authorization and a mandate for engaging in activities
which were implicitly recognized by the various state legislatures as necessary or desirable for the operation of airports authorized to be established
for public convenience and necessity. Moreover, it should be remembered
86 Id. at 424.
81 Id. at 425.
88 These are: Pinehurst Airlines Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C.
1979) (dealing with the grant of an exclusive franchise to a fixed-base operator); In re Airport

Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (dealing with an alleged
conspiracy to monopolize by car rental companies); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (dealing with the grant of an exclusive service contract to a taxicab company).
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that not only are the statutes themselves set out in general terms, but also
there is a likely absence of legislative history at the state level which can be
referred to in an effort to obtain an explicit statement of legislative intent or
mandate.
Of course, it must be recognized that the establishment and operation of
airports have been engaged in to meet the transportation and commercial
needs of the citizens of the various states. In order to have an efficient and
safe system of air transportation within a state, it is necessary to limit and
to control those operating within that transportation system. While many of
the services and activities attendant on the operation of the airport can be
viewed as peripheral, existing often mainly for the convenience of the passengers and as a base for obtaining revenues for the maintenance of the
airport facility itself, it seems an error to simply categorize all the subsidiary
activities as merely commercial, for the mere purpose of raising revenues,
and thus beyond the scope of any state legislative mandate for the operation
and establishment of airports. It seems well within the legislature's mandate
for an airport to contract out these "commercial activities" in order to provide a source of income for the maintenance of the airport facility in place
of an alternative scheme of financial support resting on tax revenues. To the
extent that these attendant services are contemplated as providing revenues
for the operation and maintenance of airport facilities, it seems likely that
the legislature intended in some cases that the grant of exclusive franchises
would provide the only effective means for obtaining such revenues. Nevertheless, these attendant services provide the principal area for litigation involving airports under the antitrust laws; it is therefore desirable to develop
an analytic scheme for evaluating antitrust complaints brought against airports and those parties with which they contract.
The following analytic framework provides a basis for considering the antitrust implications of the City of Lafayette decision for airports and airport
activities. Three principal areas of consideration seem to arise from this decision; these three areas include: (1) the variety of legislative authorizations
providing for the establishment of airports and the terms of legislative
grants of powers to cities, counties and airport authorities; (2) the distinction between central and subsidiary activities of airports; and (3) the distinction between the airport's exercise or grant of monopoly powers and the
access of private competitors to acquisition of monopoly power in providing
airport services.
The first area of consideration is derived from the holding in City of Lafayette. The more specific and direct the legislative mandate to cities, counties and statutory authorities to develop airport facilities in the public interest, the more likely the courts will be to find that these authorities are
exempt from application of the antitrust laws. The statutes of Kentucky
which were examined in Padgett v. Louisville and Jefferson County Air
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Board" provide a good example of legislation that is likely to meet the test
in City of Lafayette. That test provided "that an adequate state mandate
for anticompetitive activities of cities and other subordinate governmental
units exists when it is found from the authority given a governmental entity
to operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of
action complained of."" The Kentucky statutes provide for the establishment of an airport authority or air board with all the powers necessary to
attain the purpose of providing airport services. The Kentucky statute provides: "The board shall be a body politic and corporate with the usual corporate attributes, and in its corporate name may sue and be sued, contract
and be contracted with and do all things reasonable or necessary to effectively carry out the duties prescribed by statute."' More specifically, the
statute provided for all powers necessary for the development and operation
of airport facilities. The Kentucky statute states: "[T]he acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipping,
and operation of airports and other navigation facilities, and the exercise of
any other powers granted to air boards or municipalities in this chapter, are
hereby declared to be public, governmental and municipal functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public necessity. . . ."9 The
Sixth Circuit in Padgett," as did the First Circuit in Wiggins," found that
the exercise of monopoly power by the airport authority in compliance with
the applicable statute involved it in "acting as an instrumentality or agency
of the state, pursuant to the legislative mandate imposed upon it to operate
and manage the airport and establish rules and regulations for its use."' 5
There is no reason to believe that a court in construing the same or similar
legislation after City of Lafayette would find otherwise. This does not mean
that all state statutes will receive the same treatment after City of Lafayette; it will be necessary for a court to find that the legislation invoked by
airport authorities explicitly or implicitly mandates the exercise of monopoly powers in the establishment or operation of the airport. In the recently
decided cases discussed below, it was explicitly found that the statutory authorization under consideration did not provide such a mandate; nevertheless, those cases indicate a need to consider each state's legislation and to
proceed on an airport-by-airport analysis."1
89 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
" 435 U.S. at 415.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 183.132(2) (emphasis added).
" Ky. REV. STAT. § 183.476 (emphasis added).

91 492 F.2d at 1260.
" 362 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1966).
95 492 F.2d at 1260 citing with approval Wiggins, 362 F.2d at 55, construing 1956 Mass. Acts
c. 465 (current version at MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 73 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1967)).
See, e.g., Woolen v. Surtan Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978). The court,
after review of the legislation authorizing the establishment of airports in Texas, concluded:
"[Tihe Texas legislature did not contemplate the implementation of anticompetitive activities
by municipalities in their operation of airports." Id. at 1032.
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A second area for consideration requires that one distinguish between central and subsidiary activities of airport authorities." While, as mentioned
previously, the extent of the category 'central airport services' is difficult to
determine, it can be argued on the basis of decided cases that this type of
activity extends to the provision of passengers with ground transportation in
the form of bus or limousine services 8 and rent-a-car services."9 This central
activity also includes the provision of fixed-base operations as well as the
granting to a contracting party the exclusive right to engage in such activity,
as was the case in E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority.1"' However, as one reaches other activities provided by many airports including shops, newspaper stands and similar services, the claim of
legislative authorization becomes more tenuous, 01 and the potential for a
finding of antitrust liability increases.
The third area of consideration involves the distinction between the exercise or grant of monopoly powers and the access of competitors to the acquisition of monopoly power in providing the authorized airport services. This
concern derives strength from the concluding paragraph of the plurality
opinion in City of Lafayette where it was observed that "even a lawful monopolist may be subject to antitrust restraints when it seeks to extend or
'' 0
exploit its monopoly in a manner not contemplated by its authorization. 1 2
The nature of the legislative authorization for the activity in question will
be critical to the determination of the manner in which the airport authority
can exercise its authority or contract with others to provide the mandated
services. The more specific the legislative authorization, the more likely the
activity and the manner of its conduct will be found exempt from the antitrust laws.
B. Contracting to Provide Exclusive Services and Facilities: The NoerrPennington Exemption
Competitors who contract with airports to provide exclusive services and
facilities may be protected from antitrust liability under certain circumstances even after City of Lafayette. The specific terms of the legislative
authorization and the specific method of arriving at these terms is crucial to
See note 14 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of Carter v. Detroit Edison Co.,
420 U.S. 579 (1976).
91 See, e.g., Continental Bus Systs., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
" See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra, for definitions of these activities. See, e.g.,
Trans World Assocs., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, [1974] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 75,293
(D.D.C. 1974).
11 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966). See, e.g., Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476
F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
" See text accompanying note 14 supra for discussion of Carter v. Detroit Edison Co., 420
U.S. 579 (1976).
,0'435 U.S. at 417.

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 45

a competitor's establishing a defense under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine,
one of the still extant exemptions to City of Lafayette antitrust liability.
This doctrine, which is based upon the first amendment, was first espoused
in Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.10s In
this case, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to a
joint publicity and lobbying campaign by railroads to influence the legislators in the enactment of laws restricting competition from the trucking industry. The Court found that the Sherman Act did not effect two or more
peoples' right to associate in order to influence the political process, and
specifically found in regard to the Sherman Act that: "[tlhe proscriptions of
the Act, tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena."' The Noerr principle was affirmed in United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington.105 In Pennington, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to
efforts by mine operators and unions to persuade the Secretary of Labor and
other officials to curtail certain competitive activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.0 6
It is clear that the Noerr-Penningtonexemption applies to activities directed toward legislative and administrative officials.107 More particularly,
City of Lafayette raises a question as to the effect of efforts to influence
airport officials to adopt policies or practices of an anticompetitive nature.
This question has great significance for the private parties who seek to contract with airport authorities and to obtain exclusive contracts or franchises.
It is clear that to the extent that certain activities of an anticompetitive
nature are mandated by the legislature, these private efforts to obtain exclusive franchises may be protected by the Noerr-Pennington exemption. A
further distinction developed by the cases is one between governmental activities of airport authorities and commercial or proprietary activities of airport officials. Efforts to influence governmental decisions appear protected
by the exemption, while those directed merely at commercial or proprietary
activities are not.1 "8

10S365 U.S.
'04

127 (1961).

Id. at 141.

10 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
'0" Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, went so far as to state that: "Joint efforts to
influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate
competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme
itself violative of the Sherman Act." Id. at 670. See also United States v. Rock Royal Co-op,
307 U.S. 533, 560 (1939).
1*7 The Noerr-Penningtondoctrine at the present time clearly embraces the right of private
parties to attempt to persuade a legislative body, see, e.g., Eastern R.R. President's Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961), or executive body, see, e.g., United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965), or administrative body, see,
e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972), to take a particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint of trade or a monopoly.
'0' In other words, the activities of a barber or hosteler to influence public officials to make a
favorable decision effecting these pursuits at an airport might not be protected by the Noerr-
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Dollar Rent A Car Systems, Inc. v. Hertz Corp.109 illustrates how important the specific terms of legislative authorization have become in the context of the Noerr-Penningtondefense. In this case the plaintiff, a rental car
agency, brought a Sherman Act proceeding against the three major rental
car firms alleging a conspiracy to monopolize the on-airport automobile
rental market. The court determined that the evaluation demanded by the
Noerr-Penningtondefense must consist of consideration of each of the 140
airports in which the defendants operated, the terms of the legislative authority establishing the airports, the terms of the car rental concessions, and
the manner in which they had been obtained. To justify this type of evaluation, the court observed that the manner in granting concessions varied significantly among airports with respect to the manner by which car rental
concessions are awarded. 110 Three distinct methodologies were found to exist
for awarding these concessions: negotiation, public bid or a combination of
the two. As importantly, the court further found that the actual body with
authority to grant concessions varied among airports:
Depending upon the individual airport, concession agreements may be awarded
by a legislative body, such as a municipal council or city commission, by the
mayor or managing director of the local municipal body, or by the airport manager or his staff. Negotiations may be conducted by a city's Director of Public
Works, the Director of Finance, or the airport manager or his staff. In some
situations, the negotiations may be interspersed with public meetings at which
parties outline and discuss their plans."1
As a result of these varying factors, the court concluded that there was so
much variation among the 140 airports involved in the action, that it could
not be said as a matter of law that defendants' activities at each location
were subject to the Noerr-Pennington exception."'
The implication of Dollar Rent A Car in light of City of Lafayette is that
it is important not only that the authorizing legislation explicitly or implicitly authorize the activity, but also that it provide authority in an official or
official body to exercise the power in question. Moreover, the power in question should be exercised in a manner that provides the broadest range for
competition as is consistent with the legislative mandate if the authority is
to retain its antitrust exemption and if the contracting party is to obtain
immunity as a party to the contract providing for the noncompetitive service. Thus, competitive bidding rather than negotiation may be required absent a legislative mandate or authorization of negotiation of contracts for
Pennington exemption. In this regard, it is also pertinent that a barbershop and hotel are the
type of endeavors that are tenuously embraced by most airport enabling legislation.
1" 434 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See also Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
580 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072

(N.D. Cal. 1979).
11 434 F. Supp. at 516.

"' Id. at 517.
112 Id.
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the provision of airport services.
In Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 1 ' the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the applicability of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to parties seeking to influence the old Kansas City Municipal Airport
and thus seeking to deny the plaintiff an opportunity to provide competitive
air taxi service. The court concluded that the opening or maintaining of an
airport was a governmental problem. In reaching this conclusion the court
reasoned: "In the implementation of the City's policy concerning the opening or closing of its airports, the City is exercising part of the broad powers
of self-government granted to it as a chartered home-rule city under the
Missouri Constitution.""" The court went on to consider the applicability of
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine and concluded it provided a defense for the
private party defendants. The court observed that Noerr and Pennington
read together provide that: "[Jloint efforts to influence government action
are outside the scope of the Sherman Act, even if the combination is formed
'
for the sole purpose of eliminating competitors." 11
The court held that the
Noerr-Penningtonexception provided a defense in this case since the subject matter of the campaign, the opening or closing of an airport, was clearly
a governmental decision which the defendants had the right to seek to
influence." 6
Airport car rental litigation illustrates the limitation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as applied to the governmental or central activities of airport authorities contrasted with the subsidiary or commercial activities of
airport authorities. As has been indicated," 7 the opinion in Dollar Rent A
Car Systems, Inc. v. Hertz'1s indicates the need to consider the specific authorizing legislation as well as the particular circumstances at each airport
facility with reference to the granting of exclusive contracts or franchises. In
a consolidated multidistrict case involving eight actions brought against the
major national airport car rental companies, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California considered the application of
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to efforts to acquire and maintain exclusive
franchises by these major car rental firms."' In the consolidated action denominated In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation,'" the defendants
I's 580 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978).
.. Id. at 290.
"I Id. at 294, quoting, Note, Trade Regulation: Noerr Antitrust Immunity - Defining the
Sham Exception, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 512, 514 (1976). This conclusion would appear to be in
agreement with Justice White in Pennington, where political activity, even if the motivating
intent was anticompetitive, was held to be protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
'" Id. at 297. The court held that "The construction of the Act contended for by the defendants would extend the Sherman Act into regulation of political activity contrary to the Noerr
case." Id.
"
See text accompanying notes 109-12 infra.
"8 434 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1979).

IId.
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chose three airports to be the focus for a motion for summary judgment
predicated in part on a claim of state action immunity from the antitrust
laws. All three airports were owned and operated by local governments pursuant to broad grants of authority from the states to maintain and operate
airports. The district court found that although in these three specific cases,
the local governmental units were authorized to operate the airports, they
had no legislative mandate to make decisions having anticompetitive effects. 2 ' The court concluded that the decisions of local authorities to restrict the number of car rental concessions at these three airports were made
not to implement any state policy, but simply to maximize airport revenues.122 A showing of general authority to operate airports was found by the
court to be insufficient to establish state action immunity. Nevertheless, the
court did indicate that the state action doctrine could insulate from antitrust liability, the anticompetitive activity if the operators of airports act
pursuant to a legislative command and are subjected to active state
8
supervision.1
The court in the Airport Car Rental opinion adopted an analysis that
proceeded in the reverse direction from that in Mark Aero; rather than first
considering the nature of the airport activity and then proceeding to consider the application of the Noerr-Pennington exemption, the court began
with a consultation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and then explicitly
considered the effect of the decision in City of Lafayette on that doctrine.
The court began by considering the defendants' claim that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine entitled them to antitrust immunity because the airport
officials who were allegedly the subject of efforts at influencing were representatives of local administrative bodies.12 ' The court held however that it
was not sufficient to show that the targets of influence were officials; it reasoned that Noerr-Pennington does not immunize private parties who seek
to influence officials acting in a commercial rather than a governmental capacity.'1 5 This conclusion, the court acknowledged, rests upon a distinction
derived from its reading of City of Lafayette; specifically the court maintained that the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine should not be construed to provide private parties immunity in efforts to influence officials when, if the
officials acted in the suggested manner, they would not themselves be

"'

Id.

at 1093-98.

Id. at 1094-98. The court stated that the operation of these car rental concessions was a
proprietary and not a governmental function. Accord Justice Burger's concurring opinion in
City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389, 418-26 (1978), where he states that when the municipality is
acting in a manney that is indistinguishable from any private actor (i.e., when a municipal
utility is identical to any private utility, except for the fact that it happens to be publicly
owned instead of privately owned), the government actor will be treated as any other private
body. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
111474 F. Supp. at 1092-93.
Id. at 1078.
"'

ld. at 1084.
I,5
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immune.' 2
To determine whether activities of officials would be immune, the court in
Airport Car Rental identified two factors: "[T]he courts should consider the
extent to which the governmental body is a subordinate unit of the state,
acting in its own parochial interest rather than in the interest of implementing a particular state-policy, and it should also consider the extent to which
the governmental body is performing a commercial function comparable to
the functions
performed by other large entities making decisions in the mar12 7
ket place."'
The court in Airport Car Rental distinguished Mark Aero, construing its
subject matter, the opening of an airport, to be a governmental decision in
contrast to the subject matter of Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation,
the granting of franchises to car rental companies, which it denominated
commercial activity.'" The court then considered three specific airports in
detail, Austin, Denver and Miami, with reference to the legislative authorization and the particular manner in which car rental franchises were
awarded."2
In its examination of Robert Mueller Airport in Austin, Texas, the court
first considered the legislation authorizing the establishment of airports by
municipalities in Texas. 8 0 The court noted that this legislation provided
broad authorization for the establishment and operation of airports as well
as power for entering into contracts and leases of space for commercial purposes or for supplying services at the airport. " ' Specifically the court noted
that the Texas Municipal Airports Act provides that: "the municipality may
establish the terms and conditions and fix charges, rentals or fees for the
privileges or services, which. . . shall be established with due regard to...
the expenses of operation to the municipality."'' However, the court found
that the legislation specifically provided that in carrying out its activities
the municipality should act in conformity with state and federal laws. The
statute provided that: "No ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation or order
adopted by a municipality pursuant to this Act shall be inconsistent with, or
contrary to, any Act of the Congress of the United States or laws of this
State ... ."' The court concluded that although Austin was authorized to
' Id. at 1088. A government official would not be immune if such official were acting
proprietary capacity.
"'
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092-93, citing Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288 (8th
I"
1978).
"'
474 F. Supp. at 1093-99.
Id. at 1093-95.
Id. at 1093, construing Municipal Airports Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., arts. 461-1
I'
2; art. 46d-4(a) (Vernon 1969).
'a1 474 F. Supp. at 1094, quoting Municipal Airports Act, TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.,
46d-4(a) (Vernon 1969).
" 474 F. Supp. at 1094, quoting Municipal Airports Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.,
46d-7(b) (Vernon 1969).

in a

Cir.

and
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operate an airport and to lease out commercial space within it, there was no
indication in the authorizing statute that the legislature intended "the city
to do so in any manner that would undercut federal antitrust policy.'' a4 The
court did observe, however, in a footnote that the opinion in City of Lafayette does not require a precisely articulated statement of anticompetitive
mandate, but that it is enough that there is an indication that the legislature contemplated the kind of action at issue.' 8' Nevertheless, the court concluded that in making franchise decisions in a noncompetitive manner, the
municipal airport authority was not acting to implement any state legislative policy.
The court cited three other reasons why the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine
did not immunize defendants' actions in Austin as a result of the application
of the City of Lafayette decisions. The first was that Austin was a local
municipal body acting in a nonlegislative capacity and, as such, efforts to
influence it were not entitled to the degree of protection afforded efforts to
influence state legislatures.' Secondly, the court found that the legislative
delegation of power to manage and operate a municipal airport was so broad
as to permit the delegation of management to a private corporation. In such
a situation the court reasoned that delegation to a "quasi-governmental" administration rather than a private corporation did not transform the activities of the administration into governmental activity.8 7 Thirdly, it found
that the airport authorities themselves made their decisions regarding allocation of car rental concessions on the basis of "sound business judgment"
and that they acted in the same manner as one acting in "the best interest
of any private enterprise" for which they might work.'"
The court then turned its attention to Stapleton International Airport in
Denver, Colorado. Its analysis in this case was complicated by a "home rule"
provision in the Colorado Constitution that gave the City and County of
Denver authority "to maintain, conduct, and operate . .. transportation
systems . . . for the use of said city and county and the inhabitants
thereof."
The court concluded, nevertheless, that there was no Colorado
legislative mandate with respect to the challenged governmental activity,
therefore the conduct was not subject to the state action exemption. The
court reasoned that although the legislative grant of "home rule" power authorized Denver to operate an airport, there was no indication that the state
mandated or suggested the manner in which it was to be operated. Further,
the court reasoned that "[a] showing of general authority to operate in a
particular area is not sufficient under City of Lafayette to establish state
13

474 F. Supp. at 1094.
Id. at 1094 n.21.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1094-95.
Id. at 1095.

139 Id. quoting COLORADO

CONST.,

art. XX.
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action. ,"' 10
The court specifically declined to follow Trans World Associates, Inc. v.
City & County of Denver, which it observed relied on Parker.14 1 More importantly, the court maintained that the Trans World decision rested on a
finding of "valid governmental action" based on the Colorado statute, which
declares that the "operation of airports [is a] public governmental function. ..

."'" However, according to the court in Airport Car Rental such a

"broad legislative statement that the general operation of a municipal facility constitute[s] a governmental function is not dispositive" after City of
Lafayette since it must be determined that any specifically challenged activity is "part of a state policy to substitute regulation or monopoly for
competition.

48

The court in Airport Car Rental does seem to adopt an unnecessarily narrow reading of the opinion in City of Lafayette. It seems reasonable to assume that a state legislature, in authorizing the establishment of an airport
to meet the needs and convenience of its citizens, means to enable the authorities to exercise powers necessary to establish and to maintain such facilities. This would seem to include power to establish attendant transportation services and to develop financial resources necessary for the
maintenance of these facilities. The court seems to feel a more explicit mandate is necessary than the terms of the City of Lafayette opinion itself
would require.
Notwithstanding this criticism, it should be noted that the court in Airport Car Rental identified two additional reasons for the finding that the
car rental concessions were not subject to the state action exemption. The
first was that this activity was not sufficiently governmental, and the second
was that this activity was conducted in a manner to maximize revenues,
which led the court to further conclude that it was commercial and not governmental activity.
The third airport examined was Miami International Airport, which was
considered to be established and administered in terms comparable to the
other two airports examined. However, the court considered this airport to
present a more difficult analytical problem since the Florida legislature conferred specific authority on "home rule" counties, such as Dade County
which established the Miami airport, to grant franchises to private parties
for the operation of airport concessions. " It was thus required to consider
defendants' argument that under City of Lafayette the county was engaged
in governmental activity supported by a legislative determination that the
granting of exclusive franchises would further state policies. Nevertheless,
140

474 F. Supp. at 1096.

Id. at 1096 n.23, citing Trans World Assocs. v. City & County of Denver [1974] 2 TRADE
(CCH) 75,293 (D. Colo. 1974).
142 474 F. Supp. at 1096 n.23, referring to COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-4-1 (now § 41-4-101).
I'l 474 F. Supp. at 1096 n.23.
I Id. at 1097, 1098, citing FLA. STAT. § 125.012(17) (1972).
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the court found that the Florida statutes specifically limited this power by
the restriction that its exercise not violate the Constitution or laws of the
United States. 145 The court concluded that the Florida legislature did not
grant airport authorities the right to award concessions in a manner that
would violate the antitrust laws. The court concluded with a finding that the
award of concessions was not done for governmental or policy reasons by the
local authority but for revenue reasons of the type that would be made by
any business.
The court in Airport Car Rental indicated significant reliance on another
Texas district court opinion, that of Woolen v. Surtan Taxicabs Inc."4 ' In
Woolen, the court considered the same Texas statutory scheme that was
before the court in Airport Car Rental in its consideration of the Austin
Airport. In Woolen, the court was presented with a claim that defendant
Texas cities and their franchises were in violation of the antitrust laws as a
result of the establishment of an exclusive franchise ground operation transportation system for the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport. The court reasoned for an antitrust exemption to be available to the municipal defendants, it would be necessary to establish that the implementation of an
exclusive taxicab service at the airport was "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly service."'147 The court construed the Texas statutes, read most favorably for the defendants, to be ambiguous as to legislative intent to displace competition.' 4 8 However, when
read in their entirety, the court concluded the Texas legislature did not contemplate the implementation 14of anticompetitive activities by municipalities
in their operation of airports. '
The importance of identifying a legislative authorization for anticompetitive arrangements even as to central airport activities is illustrated by the
opinion of a North Carolina district court in Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Services Inc.'" In this case an airline brought an action against a
second airline, a county board and a county airport authority alleging a violation of the antitrust laws in the establishment of an exclusively franchised
fixed-base operator. The court concluded that in this case the governmental
defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity as a matter of law,
nor was the private party defendant entitled to the protection of the NoerrPennington doctrine.
The court cited City of Lafayette as authority for the proposition that the
municipal authorities were not entitled to a presumption of implied exclu110
Id. at 1097-98, citing FLA. STAT. § 125.012(10) (1972).
140 461 F. Supp, 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978), cited in 474 F. Supp. at 1094, 1096.
147461 F. Supp. at 1031.
140 Id. at 1031, construing Municipal Airports Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 46d-1 to
46d-22 (Vernon 1969).
141461 F. Supp. at 1031, construing Municipal Airports Act, Tax. Rev. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
46d-7 (Vernon 1969).
1" 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 45

sion from coverage under the antitrust laws. 15' The court observed that anticompetitive activity of the municipal and airport authorities was exempt
only to the extent that it was pursuant to a state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service. 15 2
While the court admitted some difficulty in identifying and applying the
proper standard under City of Lafayette, it nevertheless concluded that the
state action exemption shoufd not be applied in the instant case. " Although, it determined that the operation of the airport facility was more a
proprietary or commercial activity than a governmental one, it did not regard this determination as dispositive. Its major emphasis was on an identification of the legislative intent, which in this case was determined to grant
authority in making concessions and franchises but without exception to the
antitrust laws. Specifically, the court found that the statute "provides in
pertinent part that a county which has established an airport is authorized,
among other things, 'to confer the privileges of concessions of supplying
upon its airport goods, commodities, things, services and facilities; provided
that in each case in so doing the public is not deprived of its rightful, equal
and uniform use thereof.'""" The court reasoned that this statutory scheme
'established limits on the activities of municipalities and airport authorities
while engaged in those proprietary aspects of operating a publicly-owned
airport. The court concluded that these proprietary activities were intended
to be conducted within the parameters of the antitrust law.
In an extensive footnote, the court specifically found that there was no
showing to support the conclusion that the establishment of an exclusive
fixed-based operator was necessary to effectuate a governmental purpose.1 6 5
Additionally, it found that there was no showing that the denial of the establishment of an exclusively franchised fixed-base operation was essential
to a state plan to supersede competition.'" While the court acknowledged
such a showing was not required by City of Lafayette, it properly suggested
that such a showing would meet the tests established for state action immunity by the City of Lafayette opinion. The court in Pinehurstseems to have
ignored the features of a fixed-base operation that make them central to the
operation of an airport facility. The court could have distinguished the nature of such activity from more subsidiary activity such as car rental services, which might more easily be found to be beyond the scope of authority
to establish or operate a facility without regard to the antitrust laws.
However, the court evidenced a sensitivity to the needs of municipalities
and airport authorities which was not present in the Texas opinions. More
importantly, the court expressly recognized the possibility of explicit legisla,'

Id. at 550.

IB,

Id. at 551.

1' Id. at 552.
,6 Id. at 554, construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 65-53(3) (1975).
, 476 F. Supp. at 554 n.17.
156 Id.
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tive authorization for the conducting of airport activities without regard to
the antitrust laws. The court observed: "There also exists the possibility
that state legislatures will make explicit the right of state subdivisions to
provide monopoly services, either through' 57the language of the statutes
themselves or through legislative histories.'
The principal lesson to be gleaned from the reported cases decided after
City of Lafayette, is that explicit statutory authorization for the conduct of
airport activities without regard to the antitrust laws, and for the granting
of monopoly concessions provides the surest basis for establishing state action immunity for airport authorities; and for basing a claim to Noerr-Pennington immunity by private parties seeking such concessions. The reported
opinions, however, appear more demanding than necessary when one considers the nature and function of airport authorities and the state's interest in
providing and maintaining airport facilities with necessary attendant services. It would seem desirable for courts to supplement their recognition of
explicit statutory authorization with the analytic scheme suggested above.
Such an analytic scheme would seem consistent with the City of Lafayette
decision, would accommodate the needs of municipal airport authorities and
would achieve the reasonably intended purpose of state legislatures in authorizing the establishment and maintenance of airports. Such an analytic
scheme should begin with a determination of a grant of authority by the
legislature to the municipality to establish and maintain an airport facility.
This determination should be supplemented by an approach which distinguishes activities central to the operation of an airport facility from activities which might be characterized as subsidiary and beyond the scope of
legislative authorization to operate the facility without regard to the antitrust laws. A second feature of the proposed analytic scheme would require
the courts to determine not only that an activity was contemplated by the
legislature to be not subject to the full rigors of the antitrust laws, but that
the exercise of monopoly power or the grant of monopoly power has been
accomplished with as great an opportunity for unhampered competition as
is consistent with the provisions of the contemplated or mandated service or
activity.

V.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the decision in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light
Co., airports established by cities, counties or statutorily-created airport authorities were treated as exempt from the antitrust laws as a consequence of
their status as governmental entities. This exemption extended not only to
activities directly undertaken by airport authorities in establishing and
maintaining airports, but also to the provision of services to passengers in
151
Id. at 555-56.
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the form of ground transportation including bus service and car rental services. Private parties to these service contracts with airport authorities were
likewise treated as immune from antitrust prohibitions.
With the decision in City of Lafayette, airport authorities can no longer
claim antitrust exemption by the mere fact of their status as governmental
entities. It is now necessary to show state legislative mandate or authorization for the airport authority which explicitly or implicitly authorizes the
authority to provide the mandated activity in a noncompetitive or monopolistic manner. In order to determine whether an antitrust exemption is available to an airport authority it is necessary to determine whether the legislation authorizing the exercise of powers explicitly or implicitly authorizes the
exercise of monopoly power. It would appear desirable to further distinguish
activities central to the establishment or operation of an airport from activities which may be characterized as subsidiary; the former should be found
to be within the grant of legislative authorization and thus exempt from
antitrust prohibitions. Finally, it would seem desirable to determine whether
the exercise of monopoly power by the airport authority or the grant of monopoly power to a private firm providing a service has been accomplished
with as great an opportunity for unhampered competition as is consistent
with the provision of the mandated service.
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